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Recent Legal Trends 
By Alan Weinsteinw 
Since the Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Young v. 
American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427U.S. SO (1976), 28 ZD 329, 
local governments have been permitted to single out adult 
bookstores and theaters for special regulatory treatment. 1 In 
the wake of Young, many municipalities enacted "por­
nography zoning" ordinances based on the Detroit dispersion 
model. Observing this trend in 1978, the HARVARD LAW 
REVIEW noted that these municipalities were interpreting 
Young as approving pornography zoning as constitutional­
ly acceptable "in nearly all circumstances."2 This interpreta­
tion seemed incorrect, however, to the REvIEw's editors: 
"Detroit's pornography zoning was found to satisfy three 
established First Amendment criteria; future ordinances that 
restrict the location of adult bookstores and theaters will like­
ly be subject to these criteria as well."3 A number of recent 
lower court cases invalidating pornography zoning or­
dinances indicate that the REVIEW's prediction was on target. 
FIRST AMENDMENT TESTS UNDER YOUNG 
Justice Stevens's plurality opinion in Young set out the First 
Amendment criteria that the Detroit ordinance-and any 
future ordinances-would have to satisfy. First, regulations 
must be motivated not by distaste for the speech itself but by 
a desire to eliminate its adverse effects. Mere hostility to con­
stitutionally protected speech is an impermissible motive. 
Second, even properly motivated legislation may be un­
constitutional if its severely restricts First Amendment rights. 
Third, even a properly motivated ordinance with only a 
limited impact on free expression may be unconstitutional if 
the municipality cannot demonstrate an adequate factual 
basis for its conclusion that the ordinance will accomplish its 
objective of eliminating the adverse effect of adult 
businesses. 4 The cases that are discussed here, as well as the 
better-known Schad case decided by the Supreme Court last 
*Alan Weinstein is assistant professor of planning and business administra­
tion at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and a practicing attorney. 
Portions of this article were first prepared for the American Planning 
Association Illinois/Wisconsin Conference, held in Chicago last September. 
Randall Wondergem assisted with its preparation. 
1. In Young, the Court upheld Detroit's "dispersion-type" zoning or­
dinance, which prohibited adult bookstores and theaters from concentrating 
near each other or near bars, pool halls, and other specified uses. Specifically, 
the ordinance provided that an adult theater may not be located within 1,000 
feet of any two other regulated uses. The "regulated uses" include-in ad­
dition to adult bookstores-adult theaters and minitheaters, bars, cabarets, 
hotels and motels, pawnshops, billiard and pool halls, public lodging houses, 
secondhand stores, shoeshine parlors, and taxi dance halls. Detroit Ordinance 
742-G (Nov. 2, 1972), amending Official Zoning Ordinance of the City of 
Detroit §§32.007, 66.0000, 66.0101 (1962). 
2. "Developments in the Law-Zoning," 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1557 
(1978). 
3. Id. 
4. Id. at 1557-59. 
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summer, show that courts are not at all reluctant to invalidate 
municipal ordinances that cannot meet these criteria (Schad 
v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 49 U.S.L.W. 4597, 33 ZD 
254). 
In zoning cases, the traditional attitude of courts has been 
to defer to local officials' assessments of the facts, but in por­
nography zoning cases courts sensitive to the First Amend­
ment issues at stake have adopted a far more stringent stan­
dard of review. It is common in these cases for courts to in­
sist upon a complete record of the evidence available to 
municipal officials at the time they formulated the ordinance, 
and some cases have shown judges to be sophisticated 
analysts of planning issues. 
DISPERSION APPROACHES 
The recent invalidation of Atlanta's Adult Entertainment Or­
dinance, in Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson, 511F.Supp.1207 
(N.D. Georgia 1981), 34 ZD 7, illustrates both the stringen­
cy and sophistication of recent court reviews. Atlanta's or­
dinance, modeled on the Detroit ordinance upheld in Young, 
was enacted in November 1976. Section 1 of the ordinance 
set out the findings of fact and statements of purpose in 
language quite similar to Detroit's. The city council found 
that adult businesses blight and downgrade property values 
and have an overall adverse effect on citizens' health and 
welfare. Thus, the city council found it necessary that adult 
businesses "be subject to special regulations in order to insure 
that such uses and the effects thereof will not contribute to 
the blighting of or the downgrading of the surrounding 
neighborhood."5 
The method chosen to control adult businesses was disper­
sion: certain defined adult businesses were subject to linear 
restrictions on their location. No adult bookstore, adult 
entertainment establishment, or adult theater could be 
located within 1,000 feet of any other such use, or 500 feet 
of the boundaries of any residential district or property used 
for residential purposes, or 500 feet of any permanent struc­
ture used as a church or place of religious worship. These 
restrictions, while more stringent than Detroit's, were 
generally in line with the Detroit scheme, but the Atlanta or­
dinance also restricted all new adult businesses to three zon­
ing districts and sought to amortize certain existing 
businesses, both significant departures from the Detroit 
ordinance. 
Much of the testimony at trial dealt with the question of 
whether or not there were available sites for adult businesses 
in the three districts to which they were thus restricted: the 
C-4 Central Business District and M-1 and M-2 industrial 
districts. In Young, Justice Stevens had suggested that por­
nography zoning is constitutional only so long as the "market 
for this commodity is essentially unrestrained."6 Thus, in the 
Atlanta case the court was concerned whether the additional 
locational restrictions of the ordinance were so severe that 
they would significantly reduce, and possibly eliminate 
altogether, public access to sexually oriented businesses. The 
city contended that it was not required to make sure there 
were sufficient available sites for these adult businesses in the 
three zones, but it also contended that there were at least 81 
5. 511 F.Supp. at 1210. 




sites adequate for adult entertainment establishments. The 
court refused to defer to the Atlanta officials' assessment of 
the facts. 
While not examining the 81 sites one by one, the court did 
carefully review all the maps, documentary evidence, 
photographs, and testimony regarding site availability. On 
the basis of that review, the court found that all but 10 of the 
81 sites were wholly unacceptable as sites for adult businesses; 
of those 10 acceptable sites, no more than three or four would 
be considered by a "reasonably prudent investor" as a possi­
ble site for an adult business. 7 The court's review is notable for 
its sophistication regarding land use. 
The court first found that a few of the 81 sites were unac­
ceptable because they violated one or more of the ordinance's 
distance criteria. Many other sites were wholly unsuited for 
retail or commercial use because the lot was too small or 
because its shape precluded construction of a building of the 
proper size. One site had an easement through the middle for 
electric transmission wires. Several sites were 20 to 30 feet 
below street level, making retail or commercial uses impossi­
ble. At least one site was in a floodplain. In several instances, 
the site was unsuitable because of nearby noxious uses: one 
site was in the middle of a group of petroleum storage tanks; 
another was contiguous to a city sewage treatment plant. 
Going further, the court found that a large number of the 
proposed sites were simply unavailable and would remain so 
for the foreseeable future. Some of the proposed sites were 
employee parking lots for large, permanent manufacturing 
facilities. Other sites were occupied by buildings housing 
substantial businesses. In a number of cases, the ownership 
or use of the site made its sale to the operator of an adult 
business highly unlikely: one landowner was the city of 
Atlanta; another was the Southern Railway, and the court 
felt that it was unlikely to sell or lease any of its railroad right­
of-way for an adult business. 
At the time of trial, the court found that there were 42 or 
43 sexually oriented businesses in Atlanta and 12 or 13 that 
offered live entertainment. All of the live establishme:rats ex­
cept one would be affected by the amortization provision and 
would be permitted to relocate in only one of the three zon­
ing districts. The other adult businesses presently in zones 
other than the permitted zones would become nonconform­
ing uses under the ordinance and would face a ban on enlarg­
ing, extending, or reconstructing their businesses. Thus, nor­
mal attrition would slowly reduce the number of adult 
bookstores and theaters in districts other than C-4, M-1, and 
M-2. On the basis of these facts, the court concluded that 
allowing the ordinance to stand would reduce public access 
in Atlanta to both live, sexually oriented entertainment and 
to movies, books, and paraphernalia characterized by an em­
phasis on sex. 
Although the court's finding of restricted access was, by 
itself, enough to invalidate the ordinance-it clearly violated 
Justice Stevens's second criterion-the Atlanta scheme suf­
fered from many other faults. The court found the definitions 
of adult businesses to be substantially overbroad. The or­
dinance defined "adult bookstore" so loosely that, in the view 
of the court, the definition would include the federal court­
house and numerous private dwellings. The definition of an 
7. In making these findings, the court did not consider either the price of 
the land or whether the land was presently for sale. 
adult theater could easily be read to include downtown hotels 
that offered "adult movies'' on cable television in guests' 
rooms. 
The court was also strongly influenced by evidence of an 
improper motive in enacting the ordinance. Minutes of a 
meeting of the zoning review board revealed that, in addition 
to the ordinance's stated purposes, another purpose was 
discussed: that it would help those citizens disgusted by the 
conduct of these businesses to ''zone them out of business." 
At that same meeting, an assistant city attorney indicated that 
the adult zoning ordinance was the "strongest vehicle toward 
elimination" of adult businesses and the city was "hoping for 
complete eradication" of adult businesses. The city attorney 
also stated that the effect of the ordinance would be to reduce 
the number of these establishments. 
Taken together, the evidence of an improper motive, the 
overbroad definitions, and most critically, the fact that the 
ordinance would immediately reduce or eliminate public ac­
cess to live, sexually oriented entertainment and would 
gradually reduce the availability of erotic books and movies 
led the court to declare the ordinance void for violation of 
the First Amendment. Atlanta is appealing the district court's 
ruling, but, at present, the city is discussing new legislation 
that would either copy the Detroit ordinance more closely or 
use the regulation of alcoholic beverages as a means of 
regulating adult entertainment. 8 
The Atlanta case is not unique. A general pattern is emerg­
ing in which courts strike down pornography zoning or­
dinances that violate one or more of the criteria announced 
in Young. In CLR Corp. v. Henline, 520 F.Supp. 760 (W.D. 
Michigan 1981), 34 ZD 59, a federal district court invalidated 
a pornography zoning ordinance from Wyoming, Michigan, 
a city of 62,000 adjacent to Grand Rapids. The ordinance, 
although modeled on the Detroit scheme, had the effect of en­
suring that no more than two to four adult establishments 
could locate in the city, with all the potential sites being 
located on 2,500 feet of frontage on one road near the western 
edge of the city. The court also found that the city had failed 
to provide any legislative history or factual background sup­
porting the need for the ordinance. The city contended that 
it was unnecessary for it to have a separate legislative history 
when the experience of Detroit and other cities regarding 
these ordinances has been so thoroughly documented. The 
city also sought to apply the distance restrictions of the or­
dinance in cases where no Wyoming residents were close 
enough to a potential site to prohibit the location but residents 
of Grand Rapids were-apparently the first time that distance 
requirements under the Wyoming zoning ordinance had ever 
been measured outside of the city's territorial limits. The 
court ultimately found the ordinance void under the third 
standard in Young because of the complete failure of the 
city to assert any state interest to justify the ordinance. 
LICENSING AND SPECIAL USE APPROACHES 
Perhaps the best example of special use and licensing pro­
cedures operating as prior restraints on free speech is Enter­
tainment Concepts, Inc. v. Maciejewski, 631F.2d497 (1980), 
33 ZD 129. There, the village of Westmont, a Chicago 
suburb, amended its zoning ordinance to create a new special 
use category-adult movies, indoor theaters-and passed a 
8. See N. Y. State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, 69 L.Ed.2d 357 (1981). 
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license revocation ordinance that prohibited the exhibition 
of "obscene" motion pictures. The facts surrounding this 
legislation are quite illuminating. The plaintiff operated the 
only movie theater in Westmont. On September 21, 1979, he 
began advertising "Coming Soon, Adult Movies" on the 
theater marquee and scheduled the movie Beneath the Valley 
of the Ultra-Vixens to open on November 9. On October 1, 
the village passed its special use amendment, which was 
nothing more than a one-line addition to the list of per­
mitted and special uses in the zoning ordinance. 
The court found numerous defects in the two village or­
dinances. First, the special use ordinance contained no defini­
tion of the term "adult movies"; thus the plaintiff did not 
know whether he had to apply for a special use permit even 
if he showed only one X-rated or R-rated film. The ordinance 
also was found to have as its "operative distinction" the con­
tent of the movie shown, did not advance any legitimate 
governmental interest to support the zoning amendment, and 
gave unbridled discretion to village officials to grant or deny 
a special use permit. In short, the special use ordinance could 
satisfy none of the criteria in the Stevens opinion. 
The second Westmont ordinance provided for the revoca­
tion or suspension of a movie theater's license upon a finding 
of obscenity by the village's movie review board and the 
mayor. The movie review board consisted of three Westmont 
residents who would review motion pictures publicly ex­
hibited in the village "to determine whether or not they are 
obscene." If a majority of the board found a movie obscene, 
they would report their finding to the mayor. The mayor 
would then conduct an "adversary-type hearing" where the 
movie exhibitor could contest the board's findings. If the 
movie were found obscene after this hearing, the ordinance 
provided for a 90-day license suspension for a first offense 
and permanent license revocation for a second offense. The 
court found this portion of the ordinance wholly without 
merit. Noting that a municipality "is not free to adopt 
whatever procedures it pleases for dealing with obscenity 
... without regard to the possible consequences for constitu­
tionally protected speech," the court held the licensing or­
dinance insufficient in failing to provide adequate procedural 
protections of speech and in providing the penalty of suspen­
sion or revocation. 
Special Use Permits 
County of Cook v. World Wide News Agency, 424 N.E.2d 
1173 (Ill. App. 1981), 34ZD10, is one of the latest in a line 
of cases in which courts have found that special use pro­
cedures applying only to adult businesses are invalid prior 
restraints on freedom of expression. In World Wide News 
Agency, an amendment to the Cook County zoning or­
dinance limited adult bookstores, adult theaters, and adult 
minitheaters to areas zoned C-3 and made these adult 
businesses special uses that required the issuance of a special 
use permit. The ordinance also contained a distance provi­
sion: adult businesses could not locate within 1,000 feet of an 
area zoned for residential use, although this prohibition could 
be waived if the applicant obtained the approval of 60 per­
cent of the neighbors within 1,000 feet of the proposed use. 
The combination of the distance provision with the restric­
tion of adult businesses to areas zoned C-3 meant that most 
locations for adult businesses would have to comply with 
both the special use and the 60 percent approval 
February 1982 Land Use Law 
requirements. 9 The Illinois Appellate Court held that these 
restrictions were an impermissible prior restraint on speech. 
The court was very concerned with the discretion granted to 
the county board through the special use provision and the 
"veto" that neighbors would have over most locations zoned 
to allow adult businesses. 
Business-Licensing Requirements 
Two cases from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals il­
lustrate the bounds of constitutionality when adult businesses 
are subject to licensing requirements. Genusa v. City of 
Peoria, 619 F.2d 1203 (1980), involved a Detroit-type or­
dinance that also included licensing, inspection, and 
employee permit requirements. The court upheld the distance 
provision in the ordinance and also found that both the re­
quirement of a license and the $100 license fee were 
reasonable adjuncts to the zoning scheme; i.e., it was a way 
to keep track of adult uses and assure that they complied with 
the zoning ordinance. But the court struck down the or­
dinance's requirement that adult businesses undergo a special 
inspection to ascertain whether they were in compliance with 
all provisions of the Peoria city code. 
The problem here, in the court's view, was that only adult 
businesses faced the special inspection requirement. To the 
court, this was an impermissible prior restraint on speech that 
had as its operative distinction the content of the books or 
movies that were sold or exhibited on the premises. The court 
denied that the city could have any legitimate governmental 
interest in making a special inspection of bookstores with one 
type of books, while bookstores with other types of books 
would not be inspected. For similar reasons, the court also 
invalidated a portion of the ordinance that ordered the police 
department to conduct a special investigation of applicants 
for adult business licenses and another that required 
employees of adult businesses to obtain an employee per­
mit. 10 
By contrast, Chulchian v. City of Indianapolis, 633 F.2d 
27 (1980), involved the validity of a general business licens­
ing ordinance. Chulchian, the operator of an Indianapolis 
theater that showed sexually explicit films, was denied his an­
nual business license on the grounds that there had been 
numerous arrests on the premises for "illegal, immoral, or 
obscene conduct" and that neighboring residents considered 
the theater "to create a nuisance." Chulchian charged that the 
licensing ordinance, by authorizing the closing of his theater 
9. A county official testified that there were approximately 40 to 45 C-3 
zones in unincorporated Cook County. All but three of these zones were 
within 1,000 feet of an area zoned residential. 
10. See also Wortham v. City of Tucson, 624 P.2d 334 (Ariz. App. 1981) 
(licensing ordinance impinging on First Amendment rights that gives the li­
censing authority broad discretion to refuse a permit is unconstitutional prior 
re~traint of those rights); Wendlingv. City of Duluth, 495 F.Supp. 1380 (D.C. 
Minnesota 1980), 33 ZD 160 (imposition of $500 annual fee on adult 
business~s is an unlawful prior restraint, and provisions of general licens­
ing reqmrements as applied to adult bookstores were unconstitutional for 
lack of necessary procedural safeguards); Doe v. City of Buffalo, 432 
N ·:'·S.2d 982 (1980) (unbridled authority of licensing authorities with respect 
to issuance of license was unconstitutional infringement of First Amendment 
fr~edom). The Supreme Court recently upheld a licensing scheme from 
Minot, North Dakota, that imposed a $300-per-device license fee on amuse­
ment "devices," but the case had not been reported prior to publication. See 
Min.at v. Central Ave. News, Inc .. 308 N.W.2d 851(N.D.1981), for the rul­




if he permitted illegal conduct on the premises, was an im­
permissible restraint on constitutionally protected speech. 
The court disagreed, arguing that the ordinance, although 
it covered theaters, did not regulate them on the basis of con­
tent; the ordinance applied to all businesses in Indianapolis. 
Further, the ordinance required that a licensee know that his 
conduct was illegal. Although the city of Indianapolis 
acknowledged that it bore the burden to prove such illegal 
knowledge, the city also indicated that it would not deny a 
license because of an isolated incident and conceded that it 
could not use obscenity convictions to justify the denial of 
a license. 
The court felt that under these circumstances the discretion 
granted under the ordinance was not boundless and held the 
ordinance to be constitutional. In the view of the court, the 
ordinance furthered a legitimate and substantial governmen­
tal interest that was unrelated to the suppression of free 
speech. Chulchian was denied his license for reasons wholly 
unrelated to speech; the ordinance did nothing more than 
hold the operator of a business responsible for conduct on the 
premises of which he had knowledge. Although Chulchian's 
theater had been denied a license because it had been found 
to be a nuisance, it was not a nuisance because it exhibited 
sexually explicit films. Rather, it was a nuisance because there 
had been a pattern of arrests for illegal activities associated 
with its operation as a theater. 
REGULA TING TOPLESS DANCING AND 
MASSAGE PARLORS 
The stringency of court review of pornography zoning is at­
tributable to the courts' perceived need to safeguard forms 
of expression protected by the First Amendment where there 
is widespread distaste for the form of expression itself. When 
these First Amendment concerns are either absent or are 
superseded by other constitutional concerns, the outcomes 
of court reviews are substantially different. Thus, when 
courts review ordinances that govern massage parlors or 
regulate live entertainment in establishments serving liquor, 
the analysis presented above is inappropriate. Massage 
parlors, while adult businesses, do not have First Amendment 
protection. Nude dancing is arguably "speech"; the act of 
bodily massage is definitely not. And, even though it is a pro­
tected form of expression, nude dancing and other sexually 
oriented live entertainment may be regulated in 
establishments serving liquor under the broad powers granted 
to the states by the Twenty-first Amendment (Repeal of 
Prohibition). 
Liquor Licensing Approaches 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that a state has ab­
solute power under the Twenty-first Amendment to prohibit 
totally the sale of liquor within its borders. It is equally well 
established that a state has broad power under the amend­
ment to regulate the times, places, and circumstances under 
which liquor may be sold. Ten years ago, in California v. 
LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972), the Court upheld a state's right 
to prohibit nude dancing in bars under a statute prohibiting 
acts of "gross sexuality" in establishments serving alcohol. 
Although agreeing that nude dancing had a certain protected 
status under the First Amendment, the Court stressed that the 
added presumption in favor of the validity of state regulation 
that the Twenty-first Amendment confers required that the 
regulation be upheld so long as it was not an irrational exer­
cise of the police power. 
The Court faced the issue again this past summer in New 
York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, 69 L.Ed.2d 357 
(1981). In 1977, the New York State legislature enacted 
legislation banning topless dancing in bars. The legislation 
was immediately challenged. In 1980, the New York Court 
of Appeals ruled that the law amounted to censorship of a 
constitutionally protected means of expression and that the 
state had failed to show a governmental interest sufficient to 
justify the restriction on free expression. The Supreme Court, 
without hearing argument in the case, reversed the decision. 
The Court agreed that topless dancing has a certain protected 
status, but, when liquor regulation is involved, the balance 
tips in favor of the state. In the Court's view, the law was a 
rational exercise of the police power based on the legislature's 
finding that any form of nudity coupled with alcohol in public 
places results in undesirable behavior and that such behavior 
can best be prevented by prohibiting nudity in establishments 
serving liquor. 
On remand from the Supreme Court, the New York Court 
of Appeals last November held that the guarantee of freedom 
of expression in the New York State constitution served to 
invalidate the ban on topless dancing independently of 
the U.S. Constitution and again declared the legislation 
unconstitutional. 
In its first opinion in the case, Bellanca v. New York State 
Liquor Authority, SO N.Y.2d 524 (1980), the court of appeals 
had not found it necessary to consider the New York State 
constitution, holding that the statute was invalid under the 
U.S. Constitution. On remand, the majority based its holding 
on two arguments: first, that there were no legislative findings 
to support the state's exercise of its authority to ban topless 
dancing; and second, that, since the New York State constitu­
tion contains no provision similar to the Twenty-first 
Amendment, the state constitution's guarantee of free expres­
sion is "undiminished" by other policy considerations and 
thus serves to prohibit the legislature's ban on topless danc­
ing even when the federal Constitution would not. 11 
11. The majority opinion, however, is far from satisfying. The majori­
ty's first argument-the absence of legislative findings-hinges on interpreta­
tion of a "Legislative Support Memorandum" that accompanies the topless 
dancing statute. In the view of the majority, this document is nothing more 
than "the memorandum of the assemblyman who introduced the bill" and, 
"[a)lthough his memorandum might perhaps be classified as part of the 
legislative history, ... there is nothing to suggest that it was adopted by the 
legislature or otherwise converted into legislative findings .... " But it was 
this same memorandum that was quoted with approval by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in support of its view that, even if explicit legislative findings were 
required to uphold the ban on topless dancing, they exist in this case. Fur­
ther, Justice Garbrielli's dissent in Bellanca on remand notes that the 
memorandum is reprinted in the 1977 NEw YoRK STATE LEGISLATIVE AN­
NUAL, which "provides contemporaneous documentation of legislative in­
tent." Thus, the majority's argument regarding the lack of legislative findings 
seems strained in the absence of any indication that the legislature was 
unaware of its own member's memorandum. 
The majority's second argument-focusing on the role of the Twenty-first 
Amendment-is equally strained. The majority argues that because the state 
constitution contains no equivalent to the Twenty-first Amendment, there 
is no countervailing constitutional reason to curtail the right to free expres­
sion. But, as Justice Jasen notes in his dissent, 'The broad sweep of the 
Twenty-first Amendment has been recognized as conferring something more 
than the normal state authority over public health, welfare, and morals," 
California v. LaRue. 409 U.S. 109, 114 (1972). In short, a state constitution 
need not contain an equivalent to the Twenty-first Amendment for the force 
of that amendment to have an effect on judging the constitutionality of state 
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Persons familiar with the cabaret business in New York 
have argued that the case will have little impact. 
Establishments that have been "using sex to sell liquor" are 
likely to switch from topless dancing to "wet T-shirt contests" 
or put "pasties" on their dancers. Establishments that are 
primarily purveyors of sexually oriented entertainment, on 
the other hand, have the option of becoming "juice bars." 
They would then be safely outside the state's regulatory 
authority. 
ZONING APPROACHES 
Massage parlors are treated quite differently from adult 
bookstores and theaters not only because their activities are 
not protected by the First Amendment but also because there 
is a strong historical link between prostitution and commer­
cial establishments that offer body massage by members of 
the opposite sex. 12 The most recent development in the regula­
tion of massage parlors has been the use of county zoning or­
dinances to control these uses. 
Two recent Texas cases illustrate the trend: Stansberry v. 
Holmes, 613 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1980), 32 ZD 212, and 
Harper v. Lindsay, 616 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1980). Noting that 
massage parlors had moved outside city limits to escape 
regulation, the Texas legislature enacted enabling legislation 
that empowered counties to adopt regulations governing the 
operation and location of massage parlors and similar 
establishments. Harris County (suburban Houston) subse­
quently adopted regulations that restricted the location of 
massage parlors by requiring owners to show that their 
businesses were at least 1,500 feet from certain other uses, in­
cluding schools, dwellings, and buildings serving alcohol. 
In reviewing the subsequent challenges to the ordinance, 
the court emphasized that its analysis of the regulations was 
guided only by the traditional standards applicable to zon­
ing regulations. So long as the ordinance was not "arbitrary 
and capricious, having no relation to the general welfare," 
it would be upheld. The court then found these regulations 
"a rational and understandable effort to deal with a perceived 
evil that affected living conditions in the area," with no 
discussion of the effects on the businesses as would be re­
quired were First Amendment rights at issue. 
actions that regulate any aspect of the sale of alcoholic beverages. The ma­
jority declined to accept this position, holding that the ban on topless danc­
ing must be justified solely on the basis of the general police power and find­
ing that, under the police power, the ban on topless dancing constituted 
an impermissible restriction on freedom of expression. However, the ma­
jority's finding on this issue is unsupported by the citation of any authority 
and seems mistaken in view of the authority that Justice Jasen cites for his 
position that under the "more than normal" police power conferred by the 
Twenty-first Amendment, the minimal restriction on free expression of a ban 
on topless dancing must give way to the critical state interest in regulating 
the sale of alcoholic beverages. 
However strained the majority opinion may be, it now stands as law in 
New York until the legislature chooses to act. Given the majority's holding, 
a new legislative enactment that bars topless dancing in establishments 
serving liquor, so long as it is accompanied by an explicit statement of 
legislative findings, should be upheld. 
12. Most land use ordinances that regulate massage parlors, which are 
usually termed Adult Physical Culture Establishments in the ordinance, 
define these uses partly by focusing on contact between members of the op­
posite sex. This is done mainly to avoid characterizing health spas and similar 
establishments as massage parlors, but New York City officials report a more 
intriguing reason. Homosexual massage parlors in New York are operated 
so discreetly that they rarely intrude on neighborhood sensibilities enough 
to become an issue. 
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GUIDELINES FOR ORDINANCE DRAFTING 
Taken as a whole, the most recent pornography zoning cases 
involving restrictions on adult businesses with First Amend­
ment protection-such as theaters and bookstores-show a 
clear pattern of strong judicial concern with maintaining com­
munity access to such businesses. In determining the constitu­
tionality of municipal adult-use ordinances, courts have 
generally looked to Justice Stevens's opinion in Young for 
guidance but have also considered Justice Powell's concur­
ring opinion in Young and the majority and concurring opin­
ions in the recent Schad case. The courts now appear to be 
guided by the following general rules. 
First, an ordinance whose effect is to severely restrict the 
locations available to accommodate adult businesses­
whether present or anticipated-will be struck down. Loca­
tional restrictions on adult businesses are permissible only if 
the "market for this commodity is essentially unrestrained." 
Thus, at minimum, ordinances should not operate to reduce 
the total number of existing adult businesses in a communi­
ty or preclude the normal operations of the market in pro­
viding new businesses as demand warrants. Further, the 
presence of adult businesses in neighboring communities to 
which residents have ''reasonable access" will not leave a 
community free to eliminate such businesses within its own 
borders. 
Second, ordinances whose wording is vague, especially 
where the definitions in the ordinance make it unclear what 
is and what is not regulated, will be struck down. A vaguely 
worded ordinance leaves the business operator uncertain as 
to whether or not his activities come within the ordinance's 
prohibitions and thus functions as a prior restraint on 
freedom of expression. 
Third, ordinances that do not develop a factual basis for 
their restrictions on adult businesses or which do not relate 
their restrictions directly to recognized zoning purposes will 
be struck down. Pornography zoning is permitted to have a 
limited impact on free expression only because it serves other 
legitimate governmental interests, such as the preservation 
of neighborhoods. To guard against regulations that are 
motivated by a distaste for constitutionally protected speech 
itself, communities must demonstrate the adverse effects 
associated with the places where the expression occurs and 
narrowly tailor their restrictions to further the specific 
governmental interests endangered by the presence of adult 
businesses. 
Fourth, and last, ordinances that grant government of­
ficials broad, unbridled discretionary powers to determine 
whether or not an adult business will be permitted to 
operate-such as special use permits and licensing 
provisions-will be struck down. The courts will permit of­
ficials discretionary power to close or prohibit an adult 
business only where their authority stems from an ordinance 
not directed solely at adult uses and where there are both 
strict limits on administrative discretion and procedures that 
safeguard First Amendment rights. 
TRENDS 
As a final comment, a recent article in the New York Times 
Magazine 13 suggests that adult businesses-and, therefore, 





the furor surrounding their regulation-may be approaching 
a rapid decline. The article notes the following: installations 
of cable television and sales of videorecorders are increasing 
rapidly; 25 to 50 percent of all prerecorded videocassettes sold 
are X-rated; when X-rated movies are offered as a separate 
feature on cable, the percentage of viewers regularly exceeds 
50 percent and goes as high as 95 percent. 
Al Goldstein, publisher of SCREW magazine and a pioneer 
in the adult entertainment business, says in the article: ''I'd 
hate at this moment to be the owner of a porno theater. Their 
obsolence is inevitable. Some people say I'm a doomsayer, 
but I think the technology speaks. X-rated films should never 
have been seen in theaters anyway. It's O.K. to see a horror 
film in a theater, but the point of a porno film is to turn you 
on, and a theater isn't the best place for that. The ideal con­
text is the home." 
Planners and the 
Unauthorized Practice of 
Law: A Lawyer's Response 
By Philip J. Tierney* 
The recent commentary by Stuart Meck entitled "Some 
Thoughts on City Planners and the Unauthorized Practice of 
Law" (33 LUL!ZD No. 10 at 6) contains valid criticisms of 
the legal community's sometimes overly protective view of 
what constitutes the practice of law. However, the article also 
contains some disturbing remarks about the lawyer's role in 
the administrative process. Meck contends that lawyers need 
not be exclusively entitled to represent clients before plan­
ning commissions and zoning boards. He observes that while: 
[i]t is true that in complex administrative proceedings legal 
training and the knowledge of an attorney would definitely be 
necessary, . . that is not the case here. Boards of zoning ap­
peals are composed of lay persons with no special legal train­
ing and often no special training at all. Despite the judicial aura 
. . . conferred upon them, boards are not courts of law. This 
is not to say that boards should not be subject to reform; in­
deed, there have been many such proposals. Rather, their pro­
cedures are not difficult for a lay representative to grasp, and 
no license to practice law is required to comprehend them." 
It is important to define what we mean by administrative 
proceedings. In this context, I take the term to mean those 
proceedings before planning commissions or zoning boards 
where evidence is presented to meet certain legal burdens of 
*Philip J. Tierney is an attorney and chief hearing examiner for Mont­
gomery County, Maryland. 
proof or persuasion and the applicant seeks to obtain a 
favorable ruling from the commission or board. I do not take 
the term to include those preliminary steps that may precede 
a formal administrative proceeding. 
Despite the lay character and informality of administrative 
proceedings, lawyers perform an indispensable function for 
clients just by being there. They are there to protect the legal 
rights of a client. The abuse or denial of these legal rights may 
occur at unpredictable moments and in the most unlikely 
situations. 
An administrative proceeding, even at the simplest level, 
involves basic due process rights. Adequate notice and a fair 
hearing are essential. Many states require opportunity for 
cross-examination. Knowledge of past administrative deci­
sions and agency adherence to them is critical. Conclusions 
of witnesses should be based upon well-reasoned testimony. 
Extraneous or irrelevant evidence should be excluded from 
the record. The board or commission should conclude the 
proceeding with written findings of fact and conclusions of 
law that are based upon evidence of record. A client's 
representative should be able to recognize these rights and 
assert them to the fullest benefit of the client. Lawyers are 
uniquely qualified to identify and enforce these rights. 
Indeed, lawyers alone possess skills that enable the client to 
take full advantage of these rights. 
A lawyer is not simply a defensive player. He or she is 
trained to arrange the presentation of evidence in the light 
most favorable to the client. The lawyer can neutralize or 
diminish opposition to the client's cause. A lawyer's involve­
ment can make the difference in a close case and provides a 
valuable insurance policy in not so close cases. 
Notwithstanding the benefits of having a lawyer as a 
representative in an administrative proceeding, they have on 
occasion represented their clients poorly. In such an event the 
client has recourse through a malpractice claim or under the 
strict professional disciplinary codes. An ample body of law 
protects clients from errant lawyers. This is not the case when 
the client's errant representative is a nonlawyer. 
Many states have already spoken on the issue of nonlawyer 
representation in administrative proceedings and have re­
jected the practice. Last year the Maryland attorney general 
ruled that nonlawyers should not act in a representational 
capacity in an administrative proceeding (Op. Atty. Gen . 
Md. 80-637). Despite Meck's skepticism, these rulings are not 
intended to protect lawyers from competition; rather, they 
are intended to protect clients from those unqualified to act 
in a representational capacity. 
Legal problems come up in unexpected ways, and lawyers 
are trained to recognize and handle them. Anything less than 
representation by counsel only shortchanges the person be­
ing represented. Lawyers carry a heavy responsibility in their 
representational capacity. It is not clear from Meck's article 
why any sensible nonlawyer would want to assume that 
burden. 
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